En Route Alexandria, Egypt -- Syrian President Assad expressed to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that he would like to see the Israel-Syria track of the peace process reactivated and to see the process resumed and go forward, a Senior Administration Official said September 12.

The official acknowledged, however, that "based on discussions we heard from each side, we still have pretty significant gaps between them on their concepts of resuming the process.... I think we still think there are possibilities, but we still see gaps, and I think if we are going to see this track reactivated, it is going to take an effort and we're not there yet," he said.

"I think that the essence of it ... is President Assad's view that the negotiations ought to pick up where they left off and why. Prime Minister Netanyahu's view is that he doesn't want to be in a position where everything that was communicated in the past by his predecessors is something that he is necessarily responsible for," the official continued. "I think there has been some evolution in the Israeli position from the standpoint of being willing to take account of what went on and why. But I think there is basically a difference on a lot of the details when it comes to that," he said.

Secretary Albright will meet with Syrian Foreign Minister Sharaa and Israeli Foreign Minister Levy in New York for further discussions, the official said. "Our role is to see if we can make it possible for the two sides to get back to direct negotiations. We'll pursue that in a way that reflects our best judgment of what makes that possible," he stated.

Following is the transcript of the briefing:

(Begin transcript)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary had a chance, obviously, in the car ride with Foreign Minister Sharaa to have a number of discussions, and about three and a half hours of discussion with President Assad. The prime issue of discussion with the President was the peace process. I think he echoed something that we heard from Prime Minister Netanyahu, that he would like to see his track reactivated. He would like to see the process resumed and go forward. On the other hand, I would have to say that based on discussions we heard from each side, we still have pretty significant gaps between them on their concepts of resuming the process. There was an agreement that we would follow on to the set of discussions with what would be separate meetings that the Secretary would have with the two foreign ministers who will be in New York during the UNGA. And in the aftermath of that, we will decide where we are and what steps we might take. I think we still think there are possibilities, but we still see gaps, and I think if we are going to see this track reactivated, it is going to take an effort and we're not there yet.

QUESTION: Based on this other gap on perception, the obvious things that, as always, Mr. Assad wants to know what the result of the negotiations will be before the negotiations begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the essence of it without getting into detail is President Assad's view that the negotiations ought to pick up where they left off and why. Prime Minister Netanyahu's view is that he doesn't want to be in a position where everything that was communicated in the past by his predecessors is something that he is necessarily responsible for. I think there has been some evolution in the Israeli position from the standpoint of being willing to take account of what went on and why. But I think there is basically a difference on a lot of the details when it comes to that. Both sides say that they are ready to go back into a wide type of setting, but they still want to have some kind of an agreed basis before they do that, and we don't' have such an agreed basis.

Q: Is Netanyahu willing to begin where the record left off?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily.

Q: Was there any discussion on terrorism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was. I would say no new ground was broken on the subject. I think it followed a fairly predictable discourse.

Q: Could I ask a little bit of a touchy-feely question? You've been at three of these opening meetings now with us and with Secretaries of State. Can you characterize the atmosphere here versus the other two on initial meetings, and also, her approach versus the other two? What jumps out at you as being different from what Baker and Christopher did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if I go back in the initial meetings, the circumstances of the three that I've been a party of were very different. In the very first one, there was no peace process. There had been no negotiations, and in fact, the initial meetings was geared much more towards what was going on in the Gulf than anything else. And the second one with Secretary Christopher, this was after Madrid, but you hadn't gotten into something like at that stage, and in this one, we're in a situation where you have had pretty serious direct negotiations at one point, but have not reached agreement, and what we are trying to do is to get back to the point where you can make headway again. And the atmosphere, notwithstanding the difference in circumstances, I think the atmosphere was rather similar. I would say it was basically a relaxed atmosphere which I think characterized all of them. I think what was a little different as I compare them, was that in previous meetings there was what I would describe as more historical discussions and how they might relate to the current setting. That was not the case today.

Q: How would she avoid that? did she have a memory lapse?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was different was the history here was not a distant history, it was recent history. It was frankly more of a discussion on what had gone on in the last few years going through the negotiations in some detail which is why I say you have a different context. You didn't have anything equivalent to this in the previous settings and this was a chance to do something that President Assad will do which I've seen him do before, at these meetings, which is to try to explain how he sees things and why he sees things. The difference was in previous settings I have seen what I would call more of a global explanation of his perceptions. this was much more focused on the peace process, whatever it takes to make it work, what had gone on before, where he saw circumstances in which progress had been made. That had a different character to it and it was put within the context of saying I want to see the peace process resumed because I want to see our track resumed.

Q: Can I ask you about what discussion there was of the Syrian opening to Iraq, what discussion there was on Doha, those kinds of questions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe those issues were covered more with the Foreign Minister. We got into the discussion on the peace process with President Assad pretty quickly and the focus stayed there for most of it.

Q: How long was the discussion with the Foreign Minister? It wasn't three and a half hours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was about 30 minutes going up and 30 minutes coming back, so it was about an hour. Thee was a brief discussion on Southern Lebanon. I wouldn't say it went on for that long.

Q: Did he give any impression insofar as his willingness to have Lebanon negotiate, if need be, a withdrawal which seems to be gaining some popularity, even in Netanyahu's cabinet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that he was able to express his views with clarity.

Q: What about the dam project?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was some discussion on that.

Q: Did he indicate how strongly he felt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that he was able to express his views with clarity.

Q: Can you help us at all on her dinner with Prime Minister Netanyahu last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It actually was quite a tasty dinner. I think we had sea bass.

Q: How did he react to her speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course there was the dinner last night.

Q: How long did it last?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we got there between 8-8:30, and I think it went on for a few hours and it was fairly lengthy, but there really was not much of a discussion of the speech. There was a continuation of the discussion on Russia and Iran.

That was the place where we had a chance to discuss Syria. There really hadn't been a chance to discuss Syria prior to that dinner, and there was further discussion also of the Palestinian track. So I think you had the Russian/Iranian issue and then you had these other two that came up. Frankly, there was not really a discussion of the speech.

Q: (inaudible)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's fair to say that (inaudible) gave up and as I said, I'm not going to get into specifics. As I said, there are gaps in perception and you have conceptual gaps as well, and I don't want to take it further than that.

Q: Did you leave Israel with any sense of what Netanyahu is ready to do should Arafat engage in a way you find credible on the security front?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we could say that there is a readiness on his part to pursue the political track, I think with some energy. I think we certainly got a picture from him. He is quite interested in an accelerated approach to permanent status discussions. He believes that it is important to go down that route because he really does feel that you aren't going to get over a lot of other hurdles unless you can make some headway there. He wants to be in a position where he is satisfied that what is being done in the security area has sufficient credibility that from his standpoint it is easier to engage in the political side. But we certainly did not see a hesitancy to pursue the political track if he feels that the security is there. And we explained what we had heard on the security earlier in the day, and the essence of what we had heard on security was that we have certain commitments. We have, I think, certain structures as well that give us somewhat greater confidence that there will be more of a systematic effort to go after the infrastructure and also to deal with what we have called the revolving door phenomenon. You know, we have to see what will happen. I think he was quite interested in what we had to say and is also in a position where he is reserving judgment. I got the sense, however, in answer to your question, that I think he would actually like to find a way to move things politically, but he still is pretty riveted on the security issue.

Q: Can I ask you as a subsection, is he in agreement that the Oslo Accords, what's left of them which you know and I think everybody else knows, should be carried out, will be carried out, will be married in the phase, to the final status talks, and secondly, did she bring a letter from Netanyahu to Assad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last question was did she bring a letter from Netanyahu to Assad. The answer is no. On the formal question, no, I would say she was able to characterize her discussion with Netanyahu. She didn't have a message per se. She characterized what the discussion had been. On the issue of Oslo he understands very well our position, and I think the way I would describe his position is that if the security responsibilities are being fulfilled, then as far as he's concerned then he understands that he has obligations. If the security responsibility is not being fulfilled, then he doesn't see the need to exercise his obligations.

Q: Reciprocity? It is reciprocity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well you know, if there has been a theme that the Secretary had, it's the theme of mutual responsibilities and the mutual responsibilities, by definition, apply to sides. They each have responsibilities that have lived up to, and the truth is that Oslo always had within it what amounted to a poor understanding, and it was built on the premises of each side doing what they were signing up to. So to summarize, I would say that his approach is of fulfilling his side of it, then I have to fulfill my side of it.

Q: Then he's not acknowledging any of her contentions, such as what he said in Ramallah yesterday that is beyond my understanding how withholding tax payments is a security issue? He does not acknowledge that there is any level on which some of these steps are punitive, humiliating of perceived as provocative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I guess what I could say is that obviously there are a number of points on which we disagree, and the money is one where we have a disagreement. I think he is not indifferent to the suffering that the Palestinians are feeling. He was very clear on that and he explained that they would be easing the closure because they know they have to find a way to ease the condition there. On the money, we have a difference of opinion.

Q: Does the Secretary find it difficult, and do you personally worry about and does she worry about the reaction perhaps in Congress to coming to Syria with all these unanswered questions surrounding their role in the Khobar bombing? Is that one of the reasons for such a limited step?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that basically you've got a finite amount of time for this trip. This was basically the period where we could fit this stop in and that's basically what dictated time.

Q: Is it a difficult issue? Are you worried about Congressional reaction, for example, until this whole thing is cleared up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Secretary is going to pursue the President's policies in the Middle East based on what she and he think is right. There are not big differences between members of Congress and the President and the Secretary on the importance of the security of Israel. But they're going to pursue and do what they think is right and that's why she did and said what she said. But there obviously are political views that exist in the United States. One obviously hears them but one has to make the decisions about what is right for American interests.

Q: How did tonight's meeting end?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It ended when we had pretty much come to an agreement that the natural follow-on to where we were was to have the Secretary follow up with the Foreign Minister separately in New York. This is a logical next place. We were obviously thinking that we've had this discussion, we've taken this discussion about as far as we can now. You want us to see what we can do. The Israelis want us to see what we can do. The next logical opportunity to see what we can do is in New York when Foreign Minister Sharaa will be there and Foreign Minister Levy will be there. So the conclusion was that in term of a natural place to follow up was she'll see Sharaa and she'll see Levy separately and we'll see where we are in light of those discussions. Obviously, the Syrians will think about what was discussed tonight. The Israelis will think about where we are. We'll let them know what went on in tonight's discussions. They'll each have a chance to think about things prior to when she would see their Foreign Ministers.

Q: Could I just follow up directly on that? Does the U.S. have a view on whether the negotiations, if and when they resume, should resume as the Israelis would like or as the Syrians would like?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our role is to see if we can make it possible for the two sides to get back to direct negotiations. We'll pursue that in a way that reflects our best judgment of what makes that possible.

Q: I'm asking you what your best judgment is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the best judgment we have is probably best shared with the parties and not shared even on a background basis.

Q: Yes, but the U.S. approved where the Labor government was willing to go, what it said to the Syrians. (inaudible) What is workable to the Netanyahu government as far as your position, you want the Golan Heights given up too, don't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Firs of all, I disagree with your characterization. It wasn't...

Q: (inaudible)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: O.K. Can I finish? It was not up to the United States to approve or disapprove.

Q: You have positions, don't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not staking out what the final status positions ought to be on these issues, and that fact is the last Israeli government adopted its own. What they did with us was based on their decision, not ours. So it wasn't a case of we approve or we disapprove. We obviously took part in the process and it was not up to us to make a judgment. We did not make a judgment.

Q: But you are for land for peace, and they told the Syrians they could have land for peace. What's the problem? Is there some inconsistency?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are still in favor of that principle because we think that is the only way you will get to an agreement. That's an American tradition as far as the principle goes. But negotiations are a whole lot more complex than a principle.

Q: I'd like to ask you if the United States has a position on the usual diplomatic practice when ongoing negotiations are suspended by one country and the government then changes and another government appears... What happens normally, in your experience, to the conversations between one sovereign government and another that haven't finished, obviously?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Clearly, it depends. If you have formal agreements, by definition the formal agreements are something that are passed on and, in fact, they're not revised. It really depends on the scope of the negotiations and what's been agreed, what's formal, what isn't. What would be legally binding, what isn't. And it is not an unusual practice when you have successor governments that they would assess what their positions are. Clearly they also are going to assess the positions in light of what the negotiating record has been, and they have to take that into account because if you don't take that into account, there's a partner there and that partner is obviously going to take it into account. so there is a certain reality as far as that goes, but there is no hard and fast rule that you can apply to all cases.

Q: Could I just follow up on one thing on the Assad meeting? Did you consider it unusual that Assad did not launch into a historical discourse? Were you encouraged by this fact? Did you see it as a hint of his wanting to be forward-leaning and genuinely intending to pursue the Syrian track?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I saw it much more as an indication of his wanting to have this opportunity with the Secretary to go through his perception of what had gone on in the negotiations. So given the time, he wanted to focus on that and he did not want to get into other issues that were not related to the negotiations. He put it into context. The context was, I want to see this process resumed. I am in favor of this process and here's how we perceive it, but I want you to understand we perceive it in this way for the following reasons based on what has gone on before. So he used the occasion to go through what was being done. It was not an effort to discuss a wide array of issues. It was an effort to focus on peace from the standpoint of what had gone on.

Q: When you said the discussion was predictable, was it generic or were there specific issues and cases discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The easiest way to answer is we have a position on terror. This is an area where we're obviously having a disagreement with the Syrians and we were in a position to go through our views and we heard their views.

(End transcript)