Washington -- In a statement before United Nations delegates, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel declared that "the current political and military stalemate (in Afghanistan) is not acceptable." She urged the international community "to move the peace process forward rather than to accept the status quo, or return to a previous state."

Speaking at a meeting on Afghanistan November 18, the Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs called on the members to engage in contacts with the Taliban. "It is not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here that Taliban be isolated," she said.

"If we wish them to moderate their policies, we should engage with them. To have such contacts does not confer recognition. What it does provide is an opening for mutual understanding and cooperation."

Raphel also voiced U.S. support for U.N. special envoy Holl's efforts "to negotiate a pullback of all forces from Kabul," which, she declared, "must be a neutral city where all Afghans feel safe and welcome."

Following is the text of the U.S. statement at the U.N. meeting on Afghanistan, as delivered by Assistant Secretary of State Raphel:

(Begin text)

I wish to express my government's appreciation to the secretary general for convening this important meeting.

What we need to do first today is put aside the rhetoric and offer our candid perspectives on developments in Afghanistan. Having done that, we may decide that we must agree to disagree. But it is vitally important that we need to move on to the next step -- that is, agreeing that it is worth our time and energy collectively to move the peace process forward, rather than to accept the status quo, or return to a previous status quo.

In our view, the current political and military stalemate is not acceptable. As winter approaches, the frontlines seem likely to remain more or less as they are now. The prize for the factions is -- and has always been -- Kabul. But the past 17 years of war in Afghanistan has proven that holding Kabul will not end the fighting. We define the status quo as one party in Kabul, and another party trying to take or retake Kabul. Today it might be the Taliban in Kabul, tomorrow Masood. However, this scenario, repeated again and again, cannot bring any measure of stability to Afghanistan. We need to break this cycle and move forward to a new solution.

Any such solution will need to take into account the realities in Afghanistan. Despite nearly universal misgivings about the Taliban movement, it must be acknowledged as a significant factor in the Afghan equation and one that will not simply disappear anytime soon. The Taliban control more than two-thirds of the country; they are Afghan, they are indigenous and, they have demonstrated staying power. The reasons they have succeeded so far have little to do with military prowess or outside military assistance. Indeed, when they have engaged in truly serious fighting, the Taliban have not fared so well.

The real source of their success has been the willingness of many Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, to tacitly trade the unending fighting and chaos for a measure of peace and security, even with severe social restrictions. We must all recognize that the Afghan people, after having been battered by relentless fighting and unrest for 17 years, are war-weary and tired of the factional fighting. The people seem eager for peace at almost any price.

We have long believed that there are both internal and external dimensions to the conflict in Afghanistan. U.N. special envoy Holl, as we have just heard, is intensely involved at working on the internal dimension -- getting the warring factions to the negotiating table. We need to discuss ways we can all help strengthen his efforts. However, we are here to consider the external dimension, the factor over which those of us here have significant control. The countries represented here today have interests in Afghanistan and varying degrees of influence with the various Afghan groups. We need to use that influence in a directed, purposeful way to achieve our goals.

We need to be clear in our own minds what we seek for Afghanistan. Fundamentally, I hope we should all be able to agree to the following:

-- we support Afghanistan's territorial integrity; we want Afghanistan to be a country at peace within its present borders and one that neither threatens nor is threatened by any of its neighbors;

-- we support an independent, sovereign Afghanistan which is not a political or military battleground for outside interests. No outside power should aspire to dominate Afghanistan;

-- finally, we support an Afghanistan which seeks to cooperate with all of its neighbors to advance mutually beneficial interests such as economic development and trade.

If we can agree that Afghanistan's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty are in our interests as well as Afghanistan's, then we should be able to work together on a common approach to maintain and strengthen the Afghan state. I think all of us would agree that any future Afghan government will have to be accountable to the international community on issues such as terrorism, narcotics and human rights.

Based on these understandings, we need to actively and energetically support the U.N. special mission on Afghanistan. To give the mission the best chance for success, we need to review its mandate as contained in UNGA resolution 50/88. We believe Mr. Holl is on the right track. Given the near-stalemate on the military front, Holl should persist in his effort to broker an unconditional cease-fire. His political talks with the factions should be free of the distraction and waste of continued fighting. All of us should stress to the warring parties the absolute imperative of stopping the fighting. We should make it clear that the international community will no longer tolerate it or supply it. With the approach of winter, a cease-fire can and should begin immediately.

We support Holl's efforts to negotiate a pullback of all forces from Kabul -- the Taliban to Chazni and Jalalabad, Dostam's forces to the north of the Salang tunnel, Masood's to the Panjshir Valley -- and his efforts to create a national security force for Kabul. Kabul must be a neutral city where all Afghans feel safe and welcome; it cannot continue to be seen as the ultimate prize for each of the groups. We also support Holl's efforts to create all-Afghan commissions charged with separate tasks -- one to oversee a cease-fire, one to put together a national security force, and another that will form or constitute an interim coalition government. We have consistently advocated that this interim coalition government must be broad-based and fully representative of the Afghan people.

The specific details and sequencing of these basic elements must be negotiated with the Afghan parties. What we must affirm today is that we will all actively support the efforts to broker a cease-fire. Some countries have pursued their own diplomatic initiatives. Where these efforts can complement or bolster Holl's efforts, they should be viewed positively. We want such diplomacy to be coordinated with the U.N.'s efforts and be fully transparent. Unilateral efforts that interfere or compete with the U.N.'s efforts do not help the cause of peace.

For example, we believe the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) has an important role to play that can be fully complementary to the U.N.'s efforts. The OIC has offered to bring certain resources to bear on the Afghan conflict. We should take the OIC up on this offer. Such resources will be sorely needed for, for example, cease-fire observers or monitors for a neutral Kabul.

While Mr. Holl is engaged with the Afghans internally, it is up to us to do all we can, individually and collectively, to end the supply of arms, ammunition, military supplies, and funding to all the warring factions. We have to seriously reckon with the fact that those of us who continue to encourage, aid, abet and support the fighting through assistance to one or more of the groups only help prolong the fighting and delay a peace. We need to pledge to end any unilateral assistance efforts and put our full faith in the U.N.'s diplomacy.

About half of us here are members of the Wassenaar arrangement. We can work within that group to strengthen national control policies regarding conventional arms transfers. Those who are not Wassenaar members can initiate unilateral embargoes on arms and supplies destined for Afghanistan. This past June, the U.S. formally instituted an arms embargo which had been a de facto policy for the last four years. We continue to support a Security Council resolution on an arms embargo.

We all need to work harder to understand the complexities of the situation in Afghanistan. We would suggest that every one here acquaint themselves with the Taliban as well as the other major players, Dostam and Masood. We have done so and we have remained neutral. Only a few governments have had contacts with the Taliban. It is not in the interests of Afghanistan or any of us here that the Taliban be isolated. If we wish them to moderate their policies, we should engage with them. To have such contacts does not confer recognition. What it does provide is an opening for mutual understanding and hopefully, future cooperation.

None of us wants the conflict in Afghanistan to continue. We maintain that the Afghan factions themselves bear the major responsibility for ending the fighting. However, those of us in the international community also share the responsibility if we in any way encourage any of the warring groups to presume they can win on the battlefield. I hope that we will decide today that a peaceful, united Afghanistan is in all of our interests. Given such a consensus, we can then work together constructively to make this goal a reality.

(End text)

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