Transcript: Powell Draws Picture of Iraqi Deception, Links to al-Qaida

(Secretary's address to Security Council on Iraqi violations of Res.


1441) (11420)





United Nations -- U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell February 5


detailed for the Security Council accumulated evidence of Iraq's


unwillingness to cooperate with the U.N. disarmament process, using


U.S. intelligence on Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction programs


and its links to terrorism.





"Today, Iraq still poses a threat, and Iraq still remains in material


breach" of its disarmament obligations, Powell told the council.


"Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come


clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and


closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its


continued defiance of this council."





"Should we take the risk that (Saddam Hussein) will not someday use


these weapons at a time and place and in a manner of his choosing, at


a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond," the


secretary said. "The United States will not and cannot run that risk


to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of


weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an


option, not in a post-September 11th world."





In a speech that lasted almost one hour and a half, Powell played


tapes of intercepted Iraqi military communications, showed


surveillance photographs of military sites, and recounted information


received from sources "who risked their lives to let the world know


what Saddam Hussein is really up to." The secretary gave background on


each piece of intelligence he was revealing, wove together sequences


of events , and provided analysis on all the weapons programs --


chemical and biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and


nuclear weapons.





"I cannot tell you everything that we know," he said. "But what I can


share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over


the years, is deeply troubling."





"Iraq's behavior demonstrates that Saddam Hussein and his regime have


made no effort -- no effort -- to disarm as required by the


international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show


that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to


produce more weapons of mass destruction," he said.





One example Powell presented was photographs of the Taji weapons


facility housing chemical munitions -- the first photograph indicating


four of the facility's 15 bunkers active, with special guards, a


decontamination vehicle and special equipment present to monitor any


leakage. A second photograph taken in December 2002 as U.N. inspectors


were arriving, showed two of the bunkers changed dramatically,


sanitized.





He described the inside of mobile biological weapons factories from


eyewitness accounts and said that Iraq may have 18 such trucks from


which it can produce enough biological agent, such as anthrax or


botulinum toxin, in a single month to kill "thousands upon thousands


of people."





"Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and


thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day,"


he said. "It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was


making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the


inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming


forward."





The secretary detailed the "potentially much more sinister" connection


between Iraq and terrorists, especially leaders of the al-Qaida


terrorist network, "a nexus," he said, "that combines classic


terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder."





Iraq is harboring the network of Abu Mussab al-Zakawi, an associate


and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants, he


said. Powell showed a photograph of what he said was a poison and


explosive training center in northeastern Iraq that the al-Zakawi


network is running.





In addition, al-Zakawi was given safe haven in Baghdad in May 2002


where he went for medical treatment and during his stay established a


base of operations with nearly two dozen other extremists, Powell


said.





"These al-Qaida affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the


movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for


his network and they've now been operating freely in the capital for


more than eight months," Powell said. "From his terrorist network in


Iraq, Zakawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond."





Following is a transcript of the secretary's remarks to the Security


Council:





(begin transcript)





U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Office of the Spokesman


(New York, New York)





February 5, 2003





(As Delivered)





REMARKS





Secretary of State Colin L. Powell


To The United Nations Security Council





February 5, 2003


New York, New York





(10:30 a.m. EST)





SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr.


Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by


expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to


be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the


situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under


UN Security Council Resolution 1441.





Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous


vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons


of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material


breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions


and 12 years.





Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime


this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.





Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come


into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member


present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and


intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq


did not comply.





And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with


returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough


standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.





This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not


on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to


conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not


detectives.





I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the


core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix


reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to have


come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which


was demanded of it."





And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th


"did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions


that have been outstanding since 1998."





My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information,


to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of


mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is


also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.





I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant


information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.





The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources.


Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are


the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations


and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have


risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really


up to.





I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with


you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is


deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and


disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior,


Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have


made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international


community.





Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his


regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass


destruction.





Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a


conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November


26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed


inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a


colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the


Republican Guard.





(The tape is played.)





SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause and review some of the key elements of


this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.





First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is


coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's coming


the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He


is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide


things.





But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if


one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's


something they should not have, something that should not be seen.





The general was incredulous: "You didn't get it modified. You don't


have one of those, do you?"





"I have one."  





"Which?  From where?"  





"From the workshop.  From the Al-Kindi Company."  





"What?"  





"From Al-Kindi."  





"I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have


something left."





"We evacuated everything.  We don't have anything left."





Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We


didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the


inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the


inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."





The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have


been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.





Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the inspectors


found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16th. On January 20th,


four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for


more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters


issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation


took place just last week, on January 30th.





(The tape was played.)





SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause again and review the elements of this


message.





"They are inspecting the ammunition you have, yes?"





"Yes.  For the possibility there are forbidden ammo."





"For the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo?"





"Yes.  





"And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas, the


scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.


Remember the first message: evacuate it."





This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of


the way and making sure they have left nothing behind.





You go a little further into this message and you see the specific


instructions from headquarters: "After you have carried out what is


contained in this message, destroy the message because I don't want


anyone to see this message."





"Okay."





"Okay."





Why? Why? This message would have verified to the inspectors that they


have been trying to turn over things. They were looking for things,


but they don't want that message seen because they were trying to


clean up the area, to leave no evidence behind of the presence of


weapons of mass destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there


and the inspectors can look all they want and they will find nothing.





This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two


isolated events. Quite the contrary, this is part and parcel of a


policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set


at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime.





We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called "a Higher Committee for


Monitoring the Inspection Teams." Think about that. Iraq has a


high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to


monitor Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them, not to


assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs.





The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by


Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam


Hussein's son, Kusay.





This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Sadi, an


advisor to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately familiar to


you, General Sadi has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact


for Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. It was General Sadi who last fall


publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally


with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Sadi's job is not to cooperate;


it is to deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not


to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn


nothing.





We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We


learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last November, the


regime had decided to resume what we heard called "the old game of


cat-and-mouse."





For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq


submitted to this Council on December 7th. Iraq never had any


intention of complying with this Council's mandate. Instead, Iraq


planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and to overwhelm the


inspectors with useless information about Iraq's permitted weapons so


that we would not have time to pursue Iraq's prohibited weapons.


Iraq's goal was to give us in this room, to give those of us on this


Council, the false impression that the inspection process was working.





You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration


rich in volume but poor in information and practically devoid of new


evidence. Could any member of this Council honestly rise in defense of


this false declaration?





Everything we have seen and heard indicates that instead of


cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of


their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they


possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely


nothing.





My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources,


solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are


facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some


examples, and these are from human sources.





Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well as to


Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with the


Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization


that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure


there are no documents left which would connect you to the OMI.





We know that Saddam's son, Kusay, ordered the removal of all


prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know


that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and


scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key


files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in


cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi


intelligence agents to avoid detection.





Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently


found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the


homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000


pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home


and placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related


to Iraq's nuclear program.





Tell me, answer me: Are the inspectors to search the house of every


government official, every Baath Party member and every scientist in


the country to find the truth, to get the information they need, to


satisfy the demands of our Council?





Our sources tell us that in some cases the hard drives of computers at


Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives?


Where did they go? What is being hidden? Why?





There is only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from


the inspectors.





Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just


documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep


them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this


Council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know


from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing


rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to


various locations, distributing them to various locations in western


Iraq.





Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of


palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape


detection.





We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have


recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction


facilities.





Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The


photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average


person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo


analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, pouring for


hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I


will try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate, to


our imagery specialists.





Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition facility, a


facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of


about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed


chemical munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up


with the additional four chemical weapons shells.





Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four


that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers.





How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a closer look.


Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the


four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure


signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at


the top that says "security" points to a facility that is a signature


item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards


and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of


the bunker. The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a


decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong. This is


characteristic of those four bunkers. The special security facility


and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area, if not at any one


of them or one of the other, it is moving around those four and it


moves as needed to move as people are working in the different


bunkers.





Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of


those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents


are gone. It's been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of


December as the UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the


inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on


the right.





The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found


nothing.





This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had


been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji. As it did


throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its


considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities.


From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant


surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is


relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice


and electronics. I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine


paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in


exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.





In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity


Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections.


Indeed, in November of 2002, just when the inspections were about to


resume, this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples.





At this ballistic missile site on November 10th, we saw a cargo truck


preparing to move ballistic missile components.





At this biological weapons-related facility on November 25th, just two


days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared --


something we almost never see at this facility and we monitor it


carefully and regularly.





At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections


began, five large cargo trucks appeared, along with a truck-mounted


crane, to move missiles.





We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites. Days after


this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I've just


highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We


don't know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already


knew about these sites so Iraq knew that they would be coming.





We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this


nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what


they had or did not have?





Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need


to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take


all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the inspectors?





Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that


would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved before,


during and after inspectors. This refusal to allow this kind of


reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph


seven of our Resolution 1441.





Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons;


they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq


has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded,


unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons, as


required by Resolution 1441. The regime only allows interviews with


inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The


official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections


announced publicly and announced ominously, that, "Nobody is ready to


leave Iraq to be interviewed."





Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting


espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with UN inspectors


was committing treason.





Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a


comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass


destruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and contained only


about 500 names despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together


a list of about 3,500 names.





Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us.


Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent


interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists


warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would


face if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors.


They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging


information is punishable by death.





Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree


to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would


be treated as a spy. This violates 1441.





In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts


were ordered to report to the headquarters of the Special Security


Organization to receive counter-intelligence training. The training


focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and


how to mislead inspectors.





Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts


corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence


services of other countries.





For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one facility were


replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors


about the work that was being done there. On orders from Saddam


Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one


scientist and he was sent into hiding.





In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to


weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay


home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi


military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to


replace the workers who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been


placed under house arrest -- not in their own houses, but as a group


at one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses.





It goes on and on and on. As the examples I have just presented show,


the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active


and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key


materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of


Resolution 1441.





The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely


a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent


any meaningful inspection work.





My colleagues, operative paragraph four of UN Resolution 1441, which


we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false


statements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at


any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of


this resolution shall constitute -- the facts speak for themselves --


shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation.





We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test, to give an Iraq an


early test. Would they give an honest declaration and would they,


early on, indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It


was designed to be an early test. They failed that test.





By this standard, the standard of this Operative Paragraph, I believe


that Iraq is now in further material breach of its obligations. I


believe this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable.





Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences


called for in UN Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in


danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will


without responding effectively and immediately.





This issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the


inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer


are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we, as a


Council, we as the United Nations say, "Enough. Enough."





The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat


that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now


turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real


and present dangers to the region and to the world.





First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about


biological weapons. By way of introduction in history, I think there


are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall


that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry, to pry an


admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Second, when


Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities


were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit -- about


this amount. This is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a


teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United


States Senate in the fall of 2001.





This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical


treatment and killed two postal workers just from an amount, just


about this quantity that was inside of an envelope.





Iraq declared 8500 liters of anthrax. But UNSCOM estimates that Saddam


Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this


dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens


of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably


accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. And that


is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for


all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they


had.





They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make


them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with


these agents such as there are 400 bombs. This is evidence, not


conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented.





Dr. Blix told this Council that Iraq has provided little evidence to


verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its


destruction. It should come as no shock then that since Saddam Hussein


forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much


intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons.





One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick


intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the


existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological


agents.





Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what


we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of


biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.





The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade


detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a


quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq


claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.





Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN


inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs.


Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an


eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these


facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production


runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. 12


technicians died from exposure to biological agents.





He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the


biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at


midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim


holy day, Thursday night through Friday.





He added that this was important because the units could not be broken


down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed by


Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive again.





This defector is currently hiding in another country with the certain


knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His


eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has been


corroborated by other sources.





A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the


details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable


facilities moving on trailers.





A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002,


that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on


road-trailer units and on rail cars.





Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that


Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the


production facilities I mentioned earlier.





We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these mobile


facilities. Here you see both truck and rail-car mounted mobile


factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical


features required by such facilities is highly detailed and extremely


accurate.





As these drawings, based on their description show, we know what the


fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and


other parts look like. We know they fit together, we know how they


work, and we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are


mounted.





As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily --


either by moving ordinary looking trucks and rail-cars along Iraq's


thousands of miles of highway or track or by parking them in a garage


or a warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground


tunnels and bunkers.





We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent


factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks


each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few --


perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps 18


that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the


thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every


single day.





It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making


biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors


to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward as


they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of


capabilities.





Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example,


they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can


produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill


thousands upon thousands of people. A dry agent of this type is the


most lethal form for human beings.





By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying


techniques for their biological weapons programs. Now Iraq has


incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production


facilities.





We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully


weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents


including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research


efforts did not stop there.





Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing


diseases such as gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera,


camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to


develop smallpox.





The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological


agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air.


For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage


jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years


ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from


beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a


jet is spraying.





In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Salleh Abdul Latif told


inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a


MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or


UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for


launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons.





Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this day, it has


provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed, evidence that


was required by the international community.





There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and


the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the


ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can


cause massive death and destruction.





If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical


weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of this


and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on


the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us


need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific


weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the


history of chemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield


experience with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam


Hussein's Iraq. Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has


never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery


shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to


increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents.





If we consider just one category of missing weaponry, 6500 bombs from


the Iran-Iraq War, UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them


would be on the order of a thousand tons.





These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. Dr. Blix


has quipped that, "Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to


know what you did with it." We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he


did with it and he has not come clean with the international


community.





We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence


from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is


what we are still waiting for.





Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete with lies.


It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons


of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will


kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after


inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of


Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.





UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put


it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever


weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it


has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX


program.





We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical


weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all


outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an


ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go


on simultaneously or on a dime. This dual-use infrastructure can turn


from clandestine to commercial and then back again.





These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections at such


facilities, would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited,


especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming.


Call it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed


their chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure


with a built in ally.





Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an


effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with


its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons. For example,


Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq State Establishment. Tariq


includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons


program and employs key figures from past programs.





That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business. What


about the delivery end? I'm going to show you a small part of a


chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for


at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production


facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed


the unusual activity in this picture.





Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and


we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle


associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes


this picture significant is that we have a human source who has


corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site


at that time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual


seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an


individual being brought together to make the case.





This photograph of the site taken two months later, in July, shows not


only the previous site which is the figure in the middle at the top


with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as


well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully


bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis


literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this


site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there


from years of chemical weapons activity.





To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq


procures needed items from around the world using an extensive


clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted


communications and human sources who are in a position to know the


facts.





Iraq's procurement efforts include equipment that can filter and


separate microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons,


equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent, growth media that


can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin,


sterilization equipment for laboratories, glass-lined reactors and


specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and


precursors. Large amts of Thionyl Chloride, a precursor for nerve and


blister agents and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an


important mustard agent precursor.





Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for


legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn


about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of


human agents?





With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and chemical


weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I


don't. And I don't think you will either after you hear this next


intercept.





Just a few weeks ago we intercepted communications between two


commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is


going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear as this


unfolds that what he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants


to make sure the other guy hears clearly to the point of repeating it


so that it gets written down and completely understood. Listen.





(Transmission.)





Let's review a few selected items of this conversation. Two officers


talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is


misunderstood. "Remove, remove." "The expression, the expression, I


got it." "Nerve agents, nerve agents." "Wherever it comes up." "Got


it." "Wherever it comes up." "In the wireless instructions." "In the


instructions." "Correction. No, in the wireless instructions"


"Wireless, I got it."





Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure


this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions?


Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be


listening. Well, somebody was.





"Nerve agents." "Stop talking about it." "They are listening to us.


Don't give any evidence that we have these horrible agents." But we


know that they do and this kind of conversation confirms it.





Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of


between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough


agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons


of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across


more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the


size of Manhattan.





Let me remind you that of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN


inspectors found recently, this discovery could very well be, as has


been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg.





The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest


of the submerged iceberg?





Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such


weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again


-- against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have


sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field


commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he


didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them.





We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam's regime


has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or


chemical weapons. A source said that 1600 death-row prisoners were


transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments.





An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted


on them, blood oozing around the victims' mouths, and autopsies


performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners.





Saddam Hussein's humanity, inhumanity, has no limits. 





Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam


Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the


contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains


determined to acquire nuclear weapons.





To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that in


1991 the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities


for the first time, and they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a


nuclear weapons program. But, based on defector information, in May of


1991, Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a


massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several


different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic


isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion.





We estimate that this illicit program costs the Iraqis several billion


dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no


nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could


have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst


case assessments that had been made before the war.





In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his


invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to


build a crude nuclear weapon, in violation of Iraq's UN obligations.


Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components


needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists


with the expertise and he has a bomb design.





Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been


focused on acquiring the third and last component: sufficient fissile


material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material,


he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is


determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb.





He is so determined that has made repeated covert attempts to acquire


high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even


after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear


Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for


enriching uranium.





By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know


that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what


these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to


serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts,


and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the


rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.





Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First,


all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree


that they can be adapted for centrifuge use.





Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are


banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an


old army trooper. I can tell you a couple things.





First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to


a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.


Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher


standard than we do, but I don't think so.





Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches


that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we


notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and


higher levels of specification, including in the latest batch an


anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces.





Why would they continue refining the specifications? Why would they


continuing refining the specification, go to all that trouble for


something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel


when it went off?





The high-tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also


have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to


acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be


used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium.





In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania,


India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production


plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30


grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas


centrifuge program before the Gulf War.





This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's


attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.





Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed


that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to


balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been


involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into


Iraq.





People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my


mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is


very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his


nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material.





He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his


nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear scientists. It


is noteworthy that over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid


increasing personal attention to Iraqis' top nuclear scientists, a


group that the government-controlled press calls openly his "nuclear


mujaheddin." He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress.


Progress toward what end?





Long ago, the Security Council, this Council, required Iraq to halt


all nuclear activities of any kind.





Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver


weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's ballistic missiles


and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.





First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam


Hussein's goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but


thousands, of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors,


but also nations far beyond his borders.





While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles,


numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside


Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a


few dozen scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a


range of 650 to 900 kilometers.





We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's


alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the Al-Samud II and the


Al-Fatah, violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this Council


in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems.





UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally imported 350 SA-2


rocket engines. These are likely for use in the Al-Samud II. Their


import was illegal on three counts: Resolution 687 prohibited all


military shipments into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of


these engines in surface-to-surface missile; and finally, as we have


just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range


limit. Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as


December, after this Council passed Resolution 1441.





What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are


intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers.


One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to


fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well


as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles.





As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has


built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever


had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on


the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large


exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The


exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one


on the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The


one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can


fly 1,200 kilometers.





This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand


has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder


for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand.





Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is not developing


the missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in


order to project power, to threaten and to deliver chemical,


biological -- and if we let him -- nuclear warheads.





Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a


variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of


what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to


modify for unmanned flight the MIG-21 and, with greater success, an


aircraft called the L-29.





However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on


developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited


for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample


evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing


spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs.





And in the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not


told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably


demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27th last year.





According to Iraq's December 7th declaration, its UAVs have a range of


only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a


test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the


racetrack pattern depicted here.





Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the


United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq's December 7th


declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this


circle and so that its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers,


unrefueled and on autopilot -- violative of all of its obligations


under 1441.





The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq's UAV program and


biologic and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq


could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters


to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or if transported to


other countries, including the United States.





My friends, the information I have presented to you about these


terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its


obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject


I now want to spend a little bit of time on, and that has to do with


terrorism.





Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that


these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist


organizations that have no compunction about using such devices


against innocent people around the world.





Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine


Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the


Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian


suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifadah. And it's no secret


that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of


attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.





But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially


much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist


network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and


modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist


network headed by Abu Massad Al-Zakawi an associate and collaborator


of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.





Zakawi, Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than


a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist


training camp. One of his specialties, and one of the specialties of


this camp, is poisons.





When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zakawi network helped


establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this


camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp.





The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other


poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch --


imagine a pinch of salt -- less than a pinch of ricin, eating just


this amount in your food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory


failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There


is no cure. It is fatal.





Those helping to run this camp are Zakawi lieutenants operating in


northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But


Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical


organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In


2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region.





After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members


accepted this safe haven. They remain there today.





Zakawi's activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast


Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment,


staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to


fight another day.





During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and


established a base of operations there. These al-Qaida affiliates


based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money and


supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now


been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.





Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida. These denials


are simply not credible. Last year, an al-Qaida associate bragged that


the situation in Iraq was "good," that Baghdad could be transited


quickly.





We know these affiliates are connected to Zakawi because they remain,


even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates, include


the poison cell plotters. And they are involved in moving more than


money and materiel. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were


arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to


associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in


Afghanistan on how to use cyanide.





From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zakawi can direct his network in


the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us, the


State Department and the Agency for International Development, we all


lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley


in Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that


day, the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to


assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell


received money and weapons from Zakawi for that murder. After the


attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to


obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials


protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zakawi or of any


of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of


Zakawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.





Now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to


approach Baghdad about extraditing Zakawi and providing information


about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi


officials twice and we passed details that should have made it easy to


find Zakawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zakawi still remains at


large, to come and go.





As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent


in Europe know, Zakawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East.


Zakawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against


countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.


According to detainees Abu Atia, who graduated from Zakawi's terrorist


camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in


2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.





Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in


France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives


connected to this global web have been arrested. The chart you are


seeing shows the network in Europe.





We know about this European network and we know about its links to


Zakawi because the detainees who provided the information about the


targets also provided the names of members of the network. Three of


those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In


the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for


explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.





The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also


targeted Britain. Later evidence again proved him right. When the


British unearthed the cell there just last month, one British police


officer was murdered during the destruction of the cell.





We also know that Zakawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi


Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they


are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zakawi's network say their


goal was to kill Russians with toxins.





We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zakawi and his


subordinates. This understanding builds on decades long experience


with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. Going back to the


early and mid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida


source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding


that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad.


Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence


service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level


contacts with al-Qaida.





We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at


least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In


1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a


senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the


director of the Iraqi intelligence service.





Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida's appalling attacks.


A detained al-Qaida members tells us that Saddam was more willing to


assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and


Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on the USS


Cole in Yemen in October 2000.





Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A


senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe,


says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s


to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.





From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played


the role of liaison to the al-Qaida organization.





Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They


say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny


do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred


are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida


could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to


forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for


help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.





And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist


terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office


in Baghdad in 1999 and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by


Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of


sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.





Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of


mass destruction. As with the story of Zakawi and his network, I can


trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq


provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this


operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it


to you now as he, himself, described it.





This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of al-Qaida's


training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand from


his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin


Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader


Mohammed Atef, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were


capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents.


They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of


Afghanistan for help.





Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq. The support


that the describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological


weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December


2000. He says that a militant known as Abdullah al-Araqi had been sent


to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring


poisons and gasses. Abdullah al-Araqi characterized the relationship


he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.





As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any


of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam


was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had


a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is


new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.





With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take


their place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass


destruction. It is all a web of lies.





When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional


domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven and


active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are


confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even


more frightening future.





And, friends, this has been a long and a detailed presentation and I


thank you for your patience, but there is one more subject that I


would like to touch on briefly, and it should be a subject of deep and


continuing concern to this Council: Saddam Hussein's violations of


human rights.





Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the


patterns of behavior that I have identified, is Saddam Hussein's


contempt for the will of this Council, his contempt for the truth,


and, most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam


Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was


one of the 20th century's most horrible atrocities. Five thousand men,


women and children died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to


'89 included mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jail


and ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of some 2,000 villages.





He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shia Iraqis and the


Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium.


Saddam Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares


to dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other


country -- tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past


decade.





Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions


and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to


his own citizens and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his


regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.





For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam Hussein has


pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East


using the only means he knows: intimidation, coercion and annihilation


of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein,


possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump


card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition.





We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass


destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's


history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans,


given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his


determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take


the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a


place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in


a much weaker position to respond?





The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American


people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass


destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a


post-September 11th world.





My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council recognized that


Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security,


and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its


disarmament obligations.





Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material


breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to


come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach


and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its


continue defiance of this Council.





My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We have an


obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with.


We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to


preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance.





Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance.  





We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in


our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that


are represented by this body.





Thank you, Mr. President.





(end transcript)