Speeches

Statements by Senior

Embassy Officials

American Embassy Tel Aviv – Press Section
Ambassador Richard H. Jones
Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations

 David Citadel Hotel Jerusalem
February 19, 2008

Good afternoon.  I would like to thank June Walker and Malcolm Honlein for their invitation for me to speak to you today.  I really am honored to be included on your agenda, which, as I understand, it includes President Peres, Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Livni, and many other prominent individuals from both inside and outside the Israeli government.

I've been asked to share my thoughts on the Annapolis process and to clarify the different avenues along which the process is proceeding, as well as to put the U.S. role in the process into perspective.

Ambassador Richard Jones addresses the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations at the David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem, February 19, 2008.(U.S. Embassy photo by Matty Stern)

First and foremost, I want you to know that I am very encouraged by where we stand today.  Momentum has been building throughout the past year, ever since a trilateral meeting that Secretary Rice held with Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas in this very hotel.  The momentum continued with several additional visits by the Secretary, President Bush's speech on the Middle East last July and the series of meetings between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas leading up to the Annapolis summit last November and which continue, by the way.

Annapolis was a clear success with a strong show of international support.  This was followed by an equally successful Paris Conference in December, where Palestinian Authority PM Fayyad presented his development strategy and the international community responded with pledges of support exceeding $7 billion.  President Bush's visit here in January for post-Annapolis consultations was so productive that he announced at the end of the visit that he would return in May.  In the five weeks since the President’s visit we have had several visits by General Jones and Fraser who have both established local operations.  Of course General Dayton has been resident here for some time.

Before going into detail, I want you to consider exactly what has been accomplished.  After seven years of stalemate, terrorist violence, and bloody conflict, we have seen the formation of negotiating teams and the start of a formal negotiating process; even more significantly, we have seen a willingness on both sides to talk about the issues that lie at the very heart of the conflict: borders, security, refugees, and, in due course, Jerusalem.  Both Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas have made personal commitments to the President to do their utmost to reach an agreement by the end of 2008.

Compared to the nervous, awkward atmosphere in the David Citadel Hotel a year ago, we have come a long way.  However, this journey really has only just begun. We know there will be many efforts to stall the Annapolis Process, such as the deplorable Qassam rocket attacks and last week’s despicable deadly suicide bombing in Dimona.  To prevent these efforts from succeeding we will need to keep a steady focus on our goals.  In this regard, it may help to review several very important and clear statements that the President made during his visit.

One thing the President said that our role is not to define specific policy positions and tell the parties to accept them.  Instead, our role is to listen and perhaps “nudge” the parties forward as appropriate, because a lasting agreement can only be achieved if the parties themselves bridge their differences.

He specifically said that the occupation which began in 1967 needs to end, but that the armistice line of 1949 will require mutually agreed upon adjustments to reflect current realities.  A Palestinian state needs to be contiguous, independent, and viable and Israel must have secure and recognized borders.  Settlement construction needs to be stopped and illegal outposts need to go.  The President characterized a Palestinian state as the homeland of the Palestinian people, in the same way that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people.

The Annapolis process is designed to help the parties achieve these goals.  It is now advancing on five simultaneous, mutually-reinforcing fronts:

First, there are the discussions between Prime Minister Olmert, President Abbas, and their respective negotiating teams, led by Foreign Minister Livni and the PLO’s Ahmed Qurei’i (also known as Abu Ala’a).  These negotiations are to culminate in an agreement on the nature of the future Palestinian state by the end of this year. This agreement will then be used to provide the impetus for implementing the long-stalled Roadmap for peace.  For example, once Palestinians begin to realize that a state is within their grasp, it will become easier for them to stand up to terror.  As borders are defined, the issue of construction in settlements or other disputed areas should become more tractable.

A second front is focused explicitly on implementation of Phase I of the Roadmap, which according to the agreement announced at Annapolis is a prerequisite – and I want to stress that – a prerequisite for implementation of the negotiated agreement.  President Bush, Prime Minister Olmert, and President Abbas agreed that the United States will develop and lead a mechanism to monitor Roadmap implementation.  The Secretary will oversee this effort herself, and she has asked Lt. General William Fraser to prepare regular reports and provide recommendations on how we can best help the parties meet their commitments.  General Fraser is in Israel, as we speak, for in depth discussions with both parties, their plans to fulfill their commitments and to understand the obstacles they face in doing so.

A third track in our efforts involves Palestinian institutional reform and economic development, both of which are essential for the establishment of a viable state.  Lt. General Keith Dayton is working to train and equip Palestinian security forces so that they have the means and the ability to enforce law and order and combat terror.  Obviously, this capacity is critical to building civilian institutions and helping the Palestinians fulfill their Roadmap commitments.

Additionally, as the Quartet’s envoy, former Prime Minister of Britain Tony Blair's mission is intended to support Prime Minister Fayyad's efforts to build the economic and institutional foundations of a viable state.  The United States is pleased that the international community has embraced this process, as witnessed by the large contributions I mentioned that were announced at the Paris Conference.

A fourth diplomatic track is the ongoing US effort to engage Arab states to support the process.  Previous peace efforts suffered from the lack of a regional component.  As a result, Arafat went to Camp David without active Arab support.  The Arabs’ active participation at Annapolis was the result of a lot of behind-the-scenes American diplomacy.  There is now a desire by leading states in the Arab world to see the conflict fully and finally resolved.  These states have promised to recognize Israel as a legitimate part of the Middle East once this occurs.

The fifth and final front on which progress is currently being made, is the elaboration of a security concept.  Former Commandant of the Marine Corps and Supreme Allied Commander for Europe retired General Jim Jones has been asked to lead this effort, which will create a vision of the future security relationships between Israel and the Palestinian state as well as the other states in the region and the international community.  General Jones has already visited Israel twice since his appointment, has established a permanent presence here which is led by his former political advisor at European Command.

In many respects, the Annapolis process is informed by lessons learned from previous efforts.  An important component of the current process is the simultaneous effort we are exerting, with our partners, on each of the different tracks.  One of the primary reasons that the two sides failed to meet their Roadmap commitments in the past was that the Roadmap failed to provide them a clear vision of where they were heading.  There was a set of instructions to follow, but no assurance that the final destination, which remained abstract, would merit the very real political sacrifices they would need to make to get there.

The overarching logic of the Annapolis process is that if a comprehensive agreement on a two-state solution can be negotiated between the parties it will strengthen the political will on both sides to meet their Phase 1 Roadmap obligations and commitments and generate support for them to do so within their respective publics, both of which have become skeptical after the failure of previous obstacles.

Another explicit tenant of the Annapolis process is that the foundations of a Palestinian state need to be laid before the edifice itself is erected.  Effective, transparent institutions and a functioning economy need to be in place from the start; in their absence, the new Palestinian state would be stillborn.  None of us has any desire to repeat the Gaza disengagement experience.  However, as painful as that experience was for all of us, if it helps us to avoid pitfalls now, we will be grateful for it.

The way forward will not be easy; we will encounter many obstacles along the way.  Hamas and its allies in terror are doing their best to impede progress.  The disparate members of Israel's body politic will have to wrestle with and come to terms with every issue that comes up for discussion.  This is going to be a long, hard slog. 

However, once a mutually acceptable vision is achieved, we believe that majorities on both sides will embrace the opportunity to achieve peace, prosperity, and security.  This will undermine Hamas’ control of Gaza, and require the Palestinian Authority to step up to the plate there.  As National Security Advisor Hadley said during the President’s visit, we are after a two state solution, not a three state solution. As Prime Minister Olmert has pointed out, it will also require some painful sacrifices by the people of Israel as their government carries out its responsibilities under the Roadmap.

Why should Israel take this difficult path?  I believe it is because the status quo is unsustainable and unacceptable to most Israelis.  After forty years very few Israelis want to rule over the Palestinian territories, but to incorporate them into Israel would alter the State’s nature irrevocably.  This is why many Israelis believe it is time to make the two-state solution a reality.  The United States is committed to assisting this effort, in a manner that ensures Israel’s long-term survival as a democratic, Jewish state.

In sum, we believe the long-term stability of Israel and the region depends on two states.  Israelis need the security that will come from secure and recognized borders.  So do Palestinians.  They also long for the dignity that will come from having a state of their own.  Both peoples can benefit handsomely from an end to their long and bloody conflict.  Neither side can afford a permanent occupation, which dehumanizes people on both sides and threatens to create despair in successive generations of both peoples. 

Please allow me to reiterate a point that cannot really be stressed enough.  That is, that the US recognizes that for Israel and most Israelis the most fundamental issue is security.  We know that the old calculus of trading peace for security was based on a false dichotomy.  Peace and security are two sides of the same coin.  You cannot have one without the other.  This is why we now have three distinguished American general officers here all working on one aspect or another of the security challenge.  Obviously, the situation in Gaza and the terrorist machinations of Hamas are unacceptable and constitute serious impediments to peace.  The daily barrages on Sderot and neighboring communities in the Negev as well as the recent suicide attack in Dimona have put tremendous pressure on Israel’s government to respond forcefully.  However, the United States believes that Israel should think long and hard before taking any step that might play into the hands of those who want to sidetrack what is without a doubt the most promising effort to achieve peace and lasting security in the past seven years.  In the long-term, the most effective way to respond to terror is not by using brute force, but by pulling the rug out from under the terrorists by giving the people who support them hope for a better life without violence.  We believe that this can best be achieved through good governance, economic development and ultimately the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

I am confident that once we change the dynamic, we will have an opportunity to rewrite the rules.  On the eve of its 60th anniversary, Israel has never been as close to realizing its dream of a secure, prosperous, vibrant Jewish state that is recognized by its neighbors.

In closing, I want to assure you again that the United States has not and will never waver in its support of Israel.  Our diplomatic partnership has never been stronger, our military cooperation has never been closer than it is now.  We share the same democratic values and face the same threats from extremists.  It is in our mutual interest that these negotiations succeed.

Thank you very much for your attention.  I would be happy to take any questions.

Begin Q&A:

QUESTION:  Mr. Ambassador, I am Bill Hess from the American Zionist Movement.  It is good to sit with you again and to learn with you from your perspective.  We have things that are progressing in this part of the world.  I was wondering, given your resume, whether you would be able to elaborate at all, both from the U.S. perspective and a personal perspective, on some of the “behind-the-scenes” actions that helped bring other Arab states to Annapolis?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Well, one of the things that Secretary Rice has done that I think is truly exceptional is she has patiently and consistently engaged Arab states throughout her tenure, particularly the states of the Gulf.  I was thinking about it earlier today and I believe that Secretary Rice has probably met more times with the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf States as a group and certainly as individuals than probably all of her predecessors combined.  I don’t believe I am exaggerating.  I remember when I used to work in the Arabian Peninsula we were kind of like the poor stepchildren of the Near East Bureau in the State Department.  It was extremely difficult for us even to get joint meetings for our Foreign Ministers with the Secretary of State.  There was an annual breakfast or lunch or some kind of eating event at the U.N. General Assembly and that was about it.  That was about the sum total of contact between the Secretary of State and these Foreign Ministers during a year.  Now, the Secretary meets regularly with these people.  She speaks with them on the phone and she comes to the region, she meets with them in New York and we even developed something we called “the GCC plus two.  GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council.  These are the states of the Gulf including Saudi Arabia but not Yemen.  She meets with them -- the plus two are Egypt and Jordan.  She meets with them as a group and she has done this repeatedly so that over time it has developed into a forum where they can discuss lots of issues.  Of course, because they are discussing issues of mutual importance this becomes only issue among several and I think that helps put it into perspective for the Arab States.  They appreciate what the Administration is trying to do.  They appreciate our efforts to stabilize Iraq.  They appreciate our efforts to confront Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and they appreciate the initiative that has now been going on for over a year here with Israel and the Palestinians.  So, I think that the combination of showing them respect, showing them that we value their views on issues that are of importance to them has helped build understanding and support on their part.  So, I am very proud of the effort that has been done with those states.

QUESTION:  Do you play a personal role with this progress?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Me personally?  No, no.  Not particularly.  David Welch is the Assistant Secretary for Near East and he is the one who goes and does this in between meetings.

QUESTION:  Ken Abramowitz, Friends of Likud.  As the Annapolis process moves forward quickly and all issues are on the table and evidently getting to Jerusalem a little sooner than people might have thought, Israel has in effect allowed the PA to reopen the Orient House.  Do you think that is a good decision on Israel’s part or do you think they are rushing into the Jerusalem talks a little too soon?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Well, I am not going to second guess the decisions of Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni on how they conduct the negotiations.  I don’t think the President would do that.  He has made it very clear that our job is to assist; it is not to try and lead these negotiations.  But I don’t really know for sure if what you just said is completely accurate.  (Prime Minister) Olmert himself has said that Jerusalem will be at the end of the negotiations.  (Foreign Minister) Livni has explained that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, that no concessions will be made on Jerusalem until the end of the talks.  So, I am not sure how much is actually going on about Jerusalem.  Your point about the Orient House is a little surprise to me.  I did see one article that suggested that some of the workers who were formerly employed at Orient House are being paid, but I don’t know that that means that Orient House itself is open. That is a factual question I honestly don’t know the answer because I just saw this myself yesterday.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible).

AMBASSADOR JONES:  If so, I am not aware of it. 

QUESTION:  Nick (inaudible) with the Orthodox Union.  Just to follow up on something you were just saying.  Press reports today had sources from the Israeli government saying that Secretary Rice has agreed with what Prime Minister Olmert told us here Sunday evening which is that Jerusalem should remain the end issue of the process.  Can you confirm whether or not Secretary Rice has indeed agreed with Prime Minister Olmert from the American perspective?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Well, I don’t know that there is any such formal agreement. But I think I repeat what I said is that I don’t think that even the President is going to try and second guess how they conduct the negotiations and I suspect that’s the nature of the basis for that statement.  Maybe there was something explicit, but I am not aware of anything explicit. 

QUESTION:  (Inaudible name) American Friends of Likud.  Thank you for speaking to us today, Ambassador.  When the President refers to an end to the occupation, from which sovereign entity were these territories occupied?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Well, at the time of the ’67 war, there were two sovereign entities involved:  Egypt had oversight of Gaza and Jordan had oversight of the West Bank.  Now you can debate whether they were part of their territory.  That is certainly true. But I think that the President was using the term perhaps not in the sense that I think you are implying but in the sense of one people being involved in controlling other people’s destiny. 

QUESTION:  Steve Goldberg, ZOA.  Since 1937 when the PEEL Commission made a recommendation to divide the area there have been countless conferences, envoys, committees and efforts to partition the land between two states.  At some point does it become clear that maybe these series of unsuccessful attempts isn’t based on a lack of goodwill or a lack of strategy but the fundamental concept is flawed?  Has the Administration given any thought to the Benny Alon Israeli Initiative which in fact would affiliate the Palestinians in the West Bank with Jordan as opposed to trying -- to once again try -- to create another Arab state in the land west of the Jordan River?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Yes.  The Jordanians have categorically renounced any claims to the West Bank and have consistently repeated that renunciation up until probably earlier today.  Certainly, every time it comes up the Jordanians have a standard line, just as the Egyptians don’t want to take responsibility back for Gaza.  So, unfortunately, I don’t think that there is any interest on the Jordanian side and given that the Palestinians are adamant to have their own state I don’t see that trying to pursue that situation is any more likely to succeed than the current efforts.

QUESTION:  Mark Rosenblum, Americans for Peace Now.  You appropriately focused your attention on Israel’s security interest in requirements.  This morning we heard from Prime Minister Fayyad who gave us a rather robust assessment and a successful assessment of the new Palestinian security effort in law and order in particular when asked about whether they had also been as effective in deploying to prevent and punish terrorism and violence.  He basically said that there was a synergy between the internal law and order and the struggle against violence and terrorism.  Could you give us your own assessment and the generals deployed here on whether or not there has been an effective attempt now to take this redeployment and take the Jericho Police Academy and have those people deployed in preventing and punishing terrorism and violence?

AMBASSADOR JONES:  That is absolutely our aim.  To respond to what you described Salam Fayyad said and I have heard the same statements before.  I think there is a synergy between criminal enforcement in fighting terrorism.  Quite honestly a lot of terrorists are criminals who do it for hire.  If you can arrest them for other offenses and get them off the street, that reduces the pool of such people, so that helps.  I think terror leads to proliferation of weapons being on the street, people seeking to procure weapons for their personal defense.  This creates arms markets which terrorists can exploit.  So, I think there is a synergy between fighting terrorism and fighting crime.  On the other hand, there are clearly terrorist elements that are not affiliated with criminals and that you can fight crime all day and you won’t stamp out terrorism.  So, that is the point that is often made to us from the Israeli perspective.  So, I would say that, you know, both sides have a point and the answer in my opinion is that fighting crime is a necessary component to fighting terrorism but it is not sufficient.  I think Fayyad would probably agree with that, that they do have to do more.  They are certainly willing to do more.  Do they have the capabilities?  Do they have the training?  Do they have sufficient numbers of people?  Probably not today.  This is part of what Keith Dayton’s mission is all about.  We are in the process of training an additional 700 people at the Jordanian International Police Training Center and we will be continuing those training courses.  You know, a lot of Israelis say it is a problem of will.  They look at the manning and according to the employment roles they literally have tens of thousands of Palestinians in the Security Forces.  Well, I am not sure how many of those people actually come to work every day and how many of them even exist any more because I think that you know old security people never die.  Their families just keep collecting their paychecks.  So, there has been a lot of bloating in the security forces.  One of the good things that Salam Fayyad did early on in his tenure was begin to reduce some of that bloating, to actually pension people off.  That is a difficult problem though.  It is a difficult problem for any military.  We have wrestled with these problems in our own country in the past.  So, there is a variety of things that need to be done and getting younger, well-trained people is going to take time.  That is why in my remarks I think I talked about institutional reform, I talked about economic development, and I said “ultimately a Palestinian State.”  One of the things that I want to make clear is that although we are pushing very hard for an agreement to create a state this year, that doesn’t mean that we create the state this year.  In fact, my belief is that any agreement would probably include an implementation schedule that would be dependent on the successful implementation of phase 1 of the Roadmap, but it would also be dependent on a phase-in of actions on both sides.  The IDF is not going to pull out of the West Bank overnight.  I don’t think they are going to do like they did in Gaza.  There may be some international force which has to deploy in the interim.  What I am trying to suggest is that what we are hoping to do before the end of the Administration is to set our clearly what the actual goals are in the creation of a state, hopefully to get to an agreement, but the implementation of the agreement could take years, quite honestly.  Just as the implementation of the Sinai disengagement took years.  So, I want to make sure everyone understands that we are not talking about our effort to actually create a state this year.

QUESTION:  Mr. Ambassador, you have been a good friend of the Conference, you have been a good Ambassador, you made quite clear several times how you feel about the bombings in Sderot.  That is a real challenge for the Israeli government.  How does the government keep from mustering some kind of all-out activity to stop those bombings?  Is there a way that diplomacy would stop the bombings?  Is there a way that the Arab forces could lean on whoever is behind them?  We assume it is Hamas.

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Yes.  That is an excellent question.  I really believe that this is one of the biggest political challenges that the government faces as it tries to pursue these negotiations.  There is a combination of things that can be done.  You ask specifically on the diplomatic front which is a relief to me because I don’t like to talk about military options as a diplomat.  But I think there are some diplomatic efforts.  The Egyptians I think were very upset and taken aback by Hamas’ brazen move of knocking down the fence along the Philadelphi corridor that separates Egypt from Gaza.  They did not like the idea that their border was porous and that literally tens – if not hundreds – of thousands of Palestinians felt that they had the right to flow across that border.  The Egyptians conducted themselves with great restraint but they made it, I think, very clear that this was unacceptable and that they would not tolerate it in the future.  They let the people shop till they dropped but gradually they tightened – they first of all reduced supplies going to El Arish which is the town where they were shopping and they gradually began repairing the fence and eventually they stopped the Palestinians and all but a few hundred I think are back across the border now.  So, they clearly have played this in their press as a violation of Egyptian sovereignty.  So, they have created I think a situation where Hamas won a victory by knocking down the fence but it may well have been a (inaudible) victory that the Egyptian government is now stronger to stand up to Hamas and there are signs that it is doing so and they are working with Israel -- both sides, Israel and Egypt very much I think want to restore the relationship.  They both understand that the peace between them is a strategic decision that was made; it is in their strategic interest.  One of the points that I have been making to Israelis is that whatever Hamas can do to you from Gaza, it is insignificant in terms of your overall national security compared to a collapse of your relationship with Egypt.  I was very pleased when the Cabinet reaffirmed their understanding that a couple of weeks ago.  I think we have put things a little back into perspective and this is going to allow Egypt and Israel to work together. A ceasefire – a cessation of rocket fire on Sderot is one of the objectives of the Egyptian diplomacy that they are pursuing now.  So, we do have allies in the Egyptians.  I think we should also engage with other Arab states, those if there are any left, that are friendly with Hamas – there are not too many these days – but unfortunately there is a lot of private support for Hamas, but if we could work on friendly Arab governments to cut back on some of that private support that would help as well.

QUESTION:  Mr. Ambassador, we are very much appreciative of what you and the President and the Secretary have done in terms of bringing the parties together and Annapolis.  I want to take a different twist though in terms of what Harold Tena (sic) asked.  He addressed the issue in a diplomacy manner and you are shying away I understand from addressing the military aspect of it.  I hope the Egyptians do work something out with Hamas so the bombings stop.  But I want to assume regrettably that may not happen.  I want to also assume although I have no knowledge, the Israelis will have to take military action in terms of Gaza.  Well, my hope is and my question, I guess is, I have to close the question, is that the United States will be understanding and responsive to Israel’s need to enter Gaza – it may not be for long – it may disrupt activities with Abbas – but Israelis have to protect their own citizens and I think they have to demonstrate to the Arab countries that they are willing to take force if necessary to defend their own people.  So, I am hopeful that the United States and you will be understanding if that occurs.

AMBASSADOR JONES:  Well, the President has said on more than one occasion that he supports and defends Israel’s right to defend itself. 

Thank you.